- "event-stream": "1.8.4"
+ "event-stream": "1.8.5"
Looks completely innocuous, a patch version bump, but it can technically be a completely different package, it may not even have any relation to any open sourced code, people can push anything to npm.
People don't check in their dependencies. event-stream is hosted on npm and downloaded by people who download packages depending on it automatically. Given this situation there is no diff of it to view.
You have to weigh the risk of going out of business because you didn't deliver value fast enough vs. the risk of having a security incident.
In the Node ecosystem there are SAAS products (https://greenkeeper.io/) that will automatically update your dependencies, run your tests, and merge in the updates (that line change I showed is an example of what it would look like) if the tests pass. That shows you how much thought Node/JS developers put into upgrading their dependencies.
The event-stream update would be done automatically in this instance because the code still worked, although it was compromised.
This hack has nothing to do with the scm but everything with the carelessness of npm.
Or are you suggesting that all code in github should be considered untrusted, but somehow able to be verified by npm?
Back in the day the source code control systems I used (primarily CVS and Subversion but also others) would send a commit/checkin email that contained the _entire_ set of diffs.
As a development lead and manager I made it part of my daily routine to _read_ the checkin emails. Of course I couldn't read every last line of code, but I could certainly spot common mistakes such as checking in extra unrelated files inadvertently; changing tabbing/formatting in code that shouldn't have changed; and often I'd spot bugs in passing. This wasn't the formal code review process, but it kept me up to date on what was going into the repo and it allowed me to catch some basic and obvious errors.
Now, back to the future and GitHub and siblings don't do this. I suspect the reason is security : the desire to not have source code floating around in potentially insecure mailboxes.
However, for an OSS project the security concern is moot.
Reading this history of this attack I feel that had someone been reading commit emails that contained the actual code changed/added, it would have been easy to detect. As it is, the typical GitHub commit notification email tells you almost nothing. You have to click through a link to see the changes (which I'm guessing nobody did in this case).