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Re:Backdoor in event-stream library dependency by stefan_ on Monday November 26, 2018 @12:32PM (#18535076)
This must be the fifth incident that could have been readily prevented if npm simply required signing for it's packages.

Just do the same thing we have for SSH: on first connection (installation), ask if you trust the other side. That goes into your authorized_keys (lock file). If you connect again (update) and the key changed, print a big scary warning. No blockchain needed.

Re:Backdoor in event-stream library dependency by yuchi on Monday November 26, 2018 @03:43PM (#18536624)
This was, from the eyes of npm Inc. and everyone else a completely legitimate ownership transfer.

There was a "human error" (Domenic trusting the wrong person) that was completely unpreventable by technological means.

There was no hijacking involved.

Re:Backdoor in event-stream library dependency by stefan_ on Monday November 26, 2018 @04:07PM (#18536805)
There is also never hijacking involved when the SSH key of my server changes, but that doesn't mean I trust SSH Inc. to verify that for me.
Re:Backdoor in event-stream library dependency by yuchi on Tuesday November 27, 2018 @07:10AM (#18541634)
In your metaphor this would be not one of your servers, but a customer’s one. Then the customer says: «oh yes, we changed the keys, it’s all ok».