but in 10 seconds after that it powers the system off because it detects something like an unauthorized OS. Sounds a bit like prevention.
I'm quite sure Microsoft would be willing to provide Apple their UEFI public key, which is what pretty much all Linux shim bootloaders are signed with.
I see this said a lot, and I find it baffling because so many Linux users demanded no secure boot at all - which is exactly the thing being called unacceptable now. (It's not just you; The Register, for instance, complained about how "malware or malicious users that gets onto your Mac can potentially alter the operating system to hide spyware right from startup" when secure boot is off, in an article otherwise complaining about how Apple must hate Linux users because secure boot is now on.) There is no increased risk of bootkit attacks to Linux users as a result of this change. There is simply a reduced risk to macOS users.
I do agree that a model (as MS implemented) where you can enroll your own keys would be better - but that would be a new feature. In the meantime, if every Macintosh from the 128K until today was acceptable, what changed?
Sure, they could make things more secure by allowing you to add your own keys. You could go ahead and add the public key for your secure bootloader that does chain-of-trust validation, but the "typical scenario" would be a user adding a generic UEFI CA that leaves them open to a modified or malicious OS.
What's the downside (to allowing it)? Do they think they need to protect users from themselves?
No way. The typical user will leave it enabled because they will only use macOS.
They provide a setting that lets you disable the boot security at will, allowing you to install Linux or any other alternative OS. Security features on macOS (as opposed to iOS) are generally optional, but enabled by default (as is the sensible choice).
They don’t provide you the ability to reprogram the T2 itself, which is a shame but not entirely without merit - compromising the T2 chip would be far more dangerous than compromising the OS in terms of persistence.