The SCTs can only be produced by these logs, and only when the log is shown the tbsCertificate data. The intent is that the log service promises to log all certificates for which it provides a timestamp. A Merkle Tree is used so that we can examine a log and obtain proof that it does indeed contain every certificate we've seen SCTs for.
So, your conspiracy needs to involve the Certificate Authority (Let's Encrypt in this case), the CT logging team at Google, and at least one third party log operator. Or it would be detected when it was tried.
No, as you alluded to, my conspiracy only needs that the user uses any of the many browsers besides chrome.
A CA compromise is still very bad, but mostly because it allows an attacker to issue valid certificates and set themselves up as a MitM more easily. Let's Encrypt is still subject to this kind of attack, but so is every other CA; it's not a new threat. That can be reasonably worked around with certificate pinning and other techniques.
"Hey, everyone's starting to encrypt and we can't get the data as easy as we used to."
"Well, DDoS is a big problem out there. What if we offered a DDoS protection service because very few companies can afford the huge pipes needed to mitigate those attacks."
"Perfect! We can offer it to free for most sites, and offer "free" SSL encryption that terminates on our end."
"Yes! We'd gain their trust by offering such a service and they'd COME TO US begging for help."
I've wondered about LetsEncrypt as well. Since they're they ones generating these "free ssl certs", don't they then have the means to the decrypt the data? Yes, I'm cynical, but I think we need to be.
Same scenario as above. "Hey, we can just offer free certs and they will just give us the keys."