Just to clarify, with two AoA sensors, you can know that there is a problem (if they disagree), but you don't know which one is erroneous.
What I find surprising about this crash is that even if there's an indication of unreliable readings, the automation proceeds to actively do stuff - I thought Boeing philosophy was to hand everything to the pilots in such a case.
> I'd suggest that if this scenario is at all close to what transpired those pilots didn't have a chance.
Yeah, absolutely devastating. In the time they had, how were they supposed to diagnose that error condition (automatic down trim), given that a) it sneakily recurs every now and then, and b) it was not prepared/trained for?
The AoA disagree alert is an optional feature on the 737[1]. My understanding is that the AoA display is optional as well[2] but does not break down the info per vane. I don't know if the gauge and alert are bundled together or available separately. So maybe you can know, maybe not.
1: https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/2018-23-51_Emergency.pdf/EAD_...
2: https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/432x481/e7...
If you watch a cockpit video of an airliner taking off you will usually hear the co-pilot announce "80 knots" and the pilot reply "cross-checked". What they are doing is checking that their air-sensor data agrees (within a reasonable margin) for the most critical information at that stage of flight (since takeoff speed is very important with the modern wing shape on an airliner).
Similarly they have A and B autopilot systems which are driven independently by two AHRS units (except in special cases like during auto-land where both systems are operational).
Which is all to say that I think they likely have two separate AoA sensors. Although, perhaps being an optional element the failure of one doesn't automatically trigger a AHRS disagree message.
Correct, the 737 NG has two separate alpha vanes[1] and I believe the MAX does as well. However the "alpha vanes disagree" alert is a paid option per the emergency AD. Likewise the AoA indicator is a paid option. There is redundancy, but the plane may be configured such that the pilot cannot determine if there is a failure.
Failure of one or both alpha vanes on an NG isn't a good thing, but failure of an alpha vane on a MAX could cause MCAS to essentially try to kill you and without that AoA disagree alert you may not know why because you've never been informed about this system, and at low altitude you likely wouldn't have time to figure out what's going on.
Edit: if that all sounds fucking insane, it is. That's why American and Southwest pilot unions are livid[2].
1: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/separation_standards/ase/201...
2: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/u-s-p...
In the 737 Max this probably got exacerbated to the point that it was possible to fly the plane into a stall by sharply increasing power in a high AoA situation (typically in a go-around). This was probably different enough to the 737NG that they felt it necessary to add the MCAS system to prevent having to do, what they considered, excessive differences training in that phase of flight.
> A former Boeing executive, speaking on condition of anonymity because discussion of accident investigations is supposed to be closely held, said that Boeing engineers didn’t introduce the change to the flight-control system arbitrarily.
> He said it was done primarily because the much bigger engines on the MAX changed the aerodynamics of the jet and shifted the conditions under which a stall could happen. That required further stall protection be implemented to certify the jet as safe.
Wow, the information in that Seattle Times article is really damning! Differences training from the 737 NG to the MAX consisted of a one hour iPad session (plus crosswind training because the permissible roll is reduced due to vertical wing tips). Livid indeed.
The series of events that caused the accident are a long story, but power was knocked out to the pilot's controls (where the one stick shaker was installed), but not the copilot's controls (which didn't have a stick shaker due to the selected options). TBH, it's doubtful that the pilots could have recovered in that specific situation, but the chances of success dropped to basically zero when they didn't have a device capable of communicating what was happening to them in time.
Of course, this is obviously different than having no warning system for the type of failure whatsoever (as appears to be the case on the MAX), but it was still a little surprising for me.
I believe the issue is that this hidden system (MCAS) relies on AoA data which can, per the above, not be validated by the pilots or the computers. Thus the fear is that the plane will go full nose down for no obvious reason. Granted the emergency AD indicates some secondary indicators that your AoA vanes have gone wonky.
Per the AA email:
> The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.
IOW hey the plane might try to kill you and while you're busy trying not to die at 5,000 ft please disable the electronic aids and grab the trim wheels by hand. Noting, of course, that it take the computer ~30 seconds to move the stabilizer from one end of its travel to the other. It'll take a person longer if you're cranking it by hand. This is, of course, all after the pilots have realized what the problem actually is. All of this at five thousand feet where you might not have 30 seconds to respond. I'd suggest that if this scenario is at all close to what transpired those pilots didn't have a chance.