Once just one single nuclear bomb destroys something significant, all bets are almost surely off. So counting doesn't help, the whole domino-effect constellation is simply too dangerous. The only sustainable solution is to reduce the arsenals the orders of magnitude, if we want to increase the chances for the humanity to survive.

The right perspective is exactly the WW I: Austrian Empire just wanted its own teeny-weeny local war (just as an perspective, as late as four years ago, some Austrian historians still claimed: "Austria didn't start the WW I -- we just started the war with Serbia -- everything else was done by everybody else"). But the domino effect ensued. The result was the whole world erupting, so badly that even WW II was a kind of an effect of WW I, as the article also recognizes.

That said I don't think your analogy holds with pre and post nuclear powers.

The escalation in WW1 was complex but from the british side we just expected it to be a short war, we'd nip over there achieve our objectives and be home for Christmas (that was actually said at the time iirc).

Escalation between states with large nuclear arsenals would likely follow a very different path.

I mean the UK is a minor nuclear power but if everyone went collectively insane we could wreck most of western Europe and the US, I mean we'd all be dead minutes later but when you have that kind of capability on the table and more crucially when the people you are firing on have that kind of capability then the "it'll all be over by Christmas" line takes on a much more macabre undertone to those giving the orders.