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Re:China Telecom's Internet Traffic Misdirection by tialaramex on Tuesday November 06, 2018 @03:00AM (#18389183)
Um, you're aware that Chrome requires SCTs (the proof that a certificate has been logged) when connecting to a site right? Do you think "the vast majority" of CAs deliver a product that doesn't work with Chrome ?

CAs aren't mandated to log certificates for you (and indeed some offer the possibility to deliberately not do so for reasons I'll get to in a minute) but if you run a mass-market CA logging certs by default is the only possible way to remain in business since otherwise your entire customer service budget will be spent explaining to customers how to log the certificates and make them work with Chrome.

Firefox and Safari have announced plans to require SCTs but without a specific version or timestamp deadline. Apple's language says "calendar year 2018" but that's probably ambitious. It scarcely matters, Chrome is already too many users for a commercial CA to ignore.

So, why aren't all CAs logging every certificate and baking the SCTs into the final certificate? Well, when a certificate is logged that makes it public, but power users may want the ability to sidestep that. For private systems they may just have decided to never run Chrome (and good luck to them in the future when IE6 on Windows XP is the only option left that doesn't check CT). But for public systems if you're technically capable you can get yourself unlogged certificates, then at launch time log them, collect the SCTs and deliver those to the TLS client rather than baking them into the certificate. Google does this, a few branding practitioners do it. It's very important to get it exactly right because if you screw up your certificates are worthless until you fix it. But if protecting naming is important to your business it's an option.

Re:China Telecom's Internet Traffic Misdirection by throwaway2048 on Tuesday November 06, 2018 @08:38AM (#18390836)
SCT does nothing by itself except some additional fields in a cert. By itself, it is of absolutely no protection whatsoever.
Re:China Telecom's Internet Traffic Misdirection by tialaramex on Tuesday November 06, 2018 @12:22PM (#18392956)
SCTs are signatures from log servers. So the presence of the SCT means now not only the CA vouches for this certificate, but also the signing logs vouch for having seen this certificate. Chrome has a policy baked into it about which logs it will trust.

Under current policy this "nothing" means Google plus at least one independent log operator claim to have seen it and logged it. This eliminates the scenario in which a powerful adversary obtains certificates but only shows them to a single victim or small victim group. Whatever they did, everybody will see it.