From the very outset, it's explicit that the system is designed such that network security and correct-operation-as-designed was based on making that behavior optimal for those with the most to lose.
In other words, miners make the most money when they operate the network as designed. Potentially malicious actors get less return behaving maliciously than they do otherwise. It's simple, dumb, brutal, and effective.
What's important is that the design of the system allows anyone with an internet connection to participate, and is in that sense open to all.
BTW, ownership of currency literally doesn't matter in a proof-of-work currency (other than the ability to affect trading price). Only in proof-of-stake systems is that a possibility, and it may be possible, through careful design, to avoid that.
- disincentivize those participating in network decisions from making them in bad faith
- ditch the bad/evil network and form their own (and if they wish and can agree upon it, punish evil participants by not giving them equal money on the forked network which would theoretically become the main one in time)
It will always be in someone's interest to attempt to take control of a network, thus eventually causing opposition interest to fork the network, thus continued fragmentation and impenetrability w.r.t. normal users
Basically, how do you solve the "government and/or private individual/group with enough wealth and/or access to resources can take control of a cryptocurrency by acquiring majority consensus" problem?
I'm not saying this is fool proof, but the innovation of Bitcoin is precisely the system which is designed to resist these things (again, it's still very hard).
In what way? If they distribute decision-making power by who has the most currency, then it's not really democratic.