That is not really true.
1) Executives can allocate sufficient resources to data protection.
2) Executives can set up a data protection committee that has similar powers to the audit committee. In the UK this would normally be placed under the non-exec chairman's control.
3) Executives can insist on an external audit
Corporate governance is complicated, but not impossible. Executives manage to keep control off the shareholders money, despite never touching it themselves. They can learn to do the same with data.
But obviously you do believe its possible for the company to change its data security practices. Obviously you believe theres a scale to protective efforts. Who better to enforce such efforts than the bosses? If not them, then who? What position is better to effect change.. than being in charge?
I agree that on any data loss, severe punishment is too much, simply because it’ll eventually happen for even mundane reasons; but discovering as a result of loss that they never did anything proper to protect that data is a pretty damned good reason for larger punishment.
I can agree that executives today have little to know insight on their data management practices, but I don’t at all see why they can’t have it tomorrow (or more likely, offloading that insight onto third party auditors, as you’d do for finances, gdpr compliance, and really anything you’re too busy to be personally involved in)
The only thing an executive can really do is issue a directive along the lines of 'we will do things this way', and then leave the interpretation of that directive to the lower ranks. Any mistakes in the implementation - even if all the interests are aligned - could lead to later accusations of mishandling of data.
I think that by now we can conclude that security is a hard problem, and that even companies that do their best (not EquiFax) are at risk.
Criminal negligence for executives is going to be very hard to prove, especially when a CEO could point to some directive that had the right intentions.
Also great to see a 'defined minimum standard of protection', but that definition had better be ironclad if you expect people to serve jailtime when those standards are violated.
I see another company every week and it is quite surprising how wide the range of security implementations is, from 'perfect' to 'incredibly sloppy', and I've yet to meet an executive that understood things well enough to know what risk exposure they had. Jailing such a CEO would just be petty revenge, and would not have the desired effect as an outcome.
If you are going to enforce jailtime then punishing the CTO/CISO/CCO would be more effective, at least they have the relevant knowledge, and would be far better placed to effect meaningful change.
We already have similar mechanisms for lower level employees violating various reporting laws regarding suspicious transactions (notaries, accountants, bank employees).