One is the real-number GCD algorithm; basically the same as Euclid's standard GCD algorithm, but with real numbers. He seems to be arguing that since Turing machines cannot represent real numbers, they cannot compute this algorithm. On the other hand, it can be easily computed with pen and paper, and he gives an example of a ruler-and-compass algorithm for evaluating it.
To me this seems a little wishy-washy; a Turing machine can approximate the problem to an arbitrary degree of precisions, just as a pen-and-paper approach is only capable to executing to a finite degree of approximation. Still, an "idealized" ruler and compass does provide a framework for describing an algorithm which is not directly Turing computable.
In fact Algebra has very deep connections to pen and paper geometry.
Apart from that... Due to the increased use of statistics, the postulates of CS might shift. One example being CAP theorem.
Every number that has periodicity in its decimals is rational... √2 doesn't have periodic decimals.
Transcendental numbers are non algebraic numbers, ie. they are not the root of any non zero polynomial with rational coefficient. √2 is algebraic
> Still, an "idealized" ruler and compass does provide a framework for describing an algorithm which is not directly Turing computable.
You could describe such an algorithm, but you could not do it in this universe. This is called hypercomputation.
"If non-computable inputs are permitted then non computable outputs are attainable"
What you're describing is the reverse direction, simulating a TM with pencil and paper, and this is doable so long as you are allowed two stacks of paper to work with, and an unlimited supply of pencil/paper. The question of simulating TMs in the real world really doesn't have anything to do with the Church-Turing thesis, though.
>Despite the generality of what I wrote above, the only feasible counterexample would be one that people can do on paper but a Turing machine somehow can't.
If some dimensionless measurable physical constant were a non-computable number, then the Church-Turing thesis would be false. In fact, if we think that certain quantities are in some sense random or arbitrary, rather than something that could be written as an equation, we should expect the Church-Turing thesis to be false with probability 1.
That's what I'm describing, but what is it the reverse of?
You wrote: "If theoretical physics can find a complete model of all particles and spacetime, and we can show that a Turing Machine can emulate it", to which I added "then a person with pencil and paper can simulate its execution", so putting these together a person with pencil and paper can simulate your complete physics model. How does that suffice as a counterexample to the Church-Turing thesis?
Also once we're talking real world, entropy is finite and there's only so many computations you can do before you run out
Church-Turing is an approach, a labeling, a thesis, not a theorem. Not being a theorem, it is not subject to proof.
One could exhibit a plausible argument that Church-Turing is wrong but that argument would not be a proof. It would not involve a sequence of mathematical argumentation that is standard for those artifacts which we call proofs. Just no.
Pointing to a concrete algorithm would not be a "proof". Maybe it would be very persuasive and the world would be persuaded to abandon Church-Turing. Still it would not be a proof.
Edit: I will admit my claim here involves a "mathematicians' thesis" that proofs are mathematical objects rather than just extra-strong arguments. So be it. I believe the whole reason Church-Turing is labeled a "thesis" rather than a theorem was because it's framers were using this distinction. And the distinction appears in the foundation of mathematics. Philosophers still argue for and against the continuum hypothesis even it's well not to be provable or disprovable - the argument is whether assuming it's true or falsehood produces good or bad mathematics. etc.
No, this is a circular definition. We define an "algorithm" as something that can be performed by a Turing machine. So the Church-Turing thesis is a trivial tautology. (Though of course a useless one.)
No, that's a terrible definition, and it isn't what computer scientists typically use, though it might be what one says if they're not careful. If someone says that "algorithm" means "what a Turing machine can compute", it's because they believe the Church-Turing thesis, which says that they're the same. If they're the same, then you can talk about them interchangeably, and "Turing machine computations" have a cleaner definition than "pen and paper algorithms", so it's convenient to talk about "Turing machine computations" as if that's the ground truth.
But if the Church-Turing thesis is false, then they're not the same, and you should be very careful not to mix them up. And we need a word for "the sorts of things you can compute by hand by a set of well-defined steps", and that's what "algorithm" has always meant.
EDIT: Note that I'm making a prediction. If a person told you that "algorithm" means "what a Turing machine can compute", ask them what "algorithm" means if the Church-Turing thesis is false. My prediction is that they'll use a different defintion, based on what you can effectively compute by hand, like the "Effective Method" wikipedia article that my sibling posted.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_method
"- It consists of a finite number of exact, finite instructions.
- When it is applied to a problem from its class:
- It always finishes (terminates) after a finite number of steps.
- It always produces a correct answer.
- In principle, it can be done by a human without any aids except writing materials.- Its instructions need only to be followed rigorously to succeed. In other words, it requires no ingenuity to succeed."
"Several independent efforts to give a formal characterization of effective calculability led to a variety of proposed definitions (general recursion, Turing machines, λ-calculus) that later were shown to be equivalent."
Concretely, that problem might look something like:
"Given N non-communicating humans, each of whom see the same 1000x1000 b/w grid. Emit the same answer as 99% of the humans to the question of whether the grid contains a Q."
That would be a problem where, if you could prove that humans can do it, but TMs can't, you've refuted the CTT.
Do I have that right?
Humans do all sorts of things that Turing machines don't (e.g. a Turing machine can't hold a pencil), so the question there is what constitutes an "algorithm" which comes right back to the definition of computation. Even an example that was obviously "computation" in the intuitive sense wouldn't make the Church-Turing definition "false", it would just mean that it defines something different from what we thought it defines.
This is not quite correct: It cannot be proven true. But it could be proven false with a counterexample. The speaker would simply have to point to a concrete algorithm that can be performed by a person with pencil and paper but not by a Turing machine (or vice versa).
I haven't had the time to watch the video, but from the comments here it appears that the speaker did not provide such an example.