Malicious sites can trick you into accepting too:
https://www.reddit.com/r/assholedesign/comments/9p3172/yeah_...
Firefox at least has very slightly more distinct pop-downs than Chrome's.
Not all the sensor APIs have a hard requirement to require permissions; accelerometer data is available at a low sampling frequency in Chrome, which as far as I'm aware avoids any known attacks based on accelerometer data.
What about a keylogger with 50% accuracy?
The accelerometer is limited to (IIRC) 25Hz without a permissions prompt. IIRC, at that sampling interval, you can't even distinguish between a phone being held in a hand and a phone in a pocket, and I know the decision to go with 25Hz was done on the basis of various studies. From memory, some study failed to get numeric PINs from full-screen entry at 60Hz, and a typical on-screen keyboard requires much more granularity than that.
For that though, you had to have an ability to do millisecond precision timestamping. I'm not math PhD, but been told by one that the only avenue to mitigate that was to drive down sampling frequency to single hertz.
Guys who write web standards today don't even try to put some farsight into security implications of countless random apis being introduced to the web standard every year.
Would Chrome unbreak the timing, or if somebody will find a workaround, that technique will become viable again.
It shouldn't be asking, ever. The answer is such a hard no, it makes me wonder why they even tried.
Definitely will be useful in my web browser.
I don't think this is true in this particular case. The user can't just click "accept", they have to explicitly choose a device to connect to.
At least this doesn't seem to be a priority feature for Mozilla yet. MDN doesn't even have proper docs for it. So I'm a bit thankful for that, for now.
As for Facebook and the accelerometer, I'm presuming you're on Android, so you can definitely blame Google for that.