It's purpose is to ensure that designs aren't modified in manufacture.
What you're talking about is a software problem, and should be carried out in addition to this.
The first idea that comes to mind is that I would sign the contents of the flash devices and have them verified once the board layout has been verified.
Essentially, you'd have your board schematic, and then a signature "schematic" of firmware to verify against. Of course, you'd also need a way of signing the schematic/signature list to verify those once they're updated.
In this case, the technology would have identified this additional component added out-of-spec. Once you've identified that a component that doesn't belong has been added you don't need to bother identifying any software attacks, it's already compromised.
Imagine a subverted NOR FLASH device with malicious firmware booting your board-management device. Its still a SPI FLASH with the same (apparent) device id. The contents would just be different.