> Another common feature is virtual USB disk media, which can be used to infiltrate or exfiltrate files or to provide new boot media. The combination of these capabilities and remote power cycling would allow an attacker to seize control of most common server configurations. For instance, they could restart the system and boot from a virtual live CD, then directly copy or modify data on the host’s storage devices
If the IPMI has write access to disc and/or main memory, you can do it more directly - drop a new /bin/login on the disc, or patch it in memory (similar to the LoJax attack: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18090651)
Maybe you aren't a native English speaker but "walk me through" is an idiom in the English language it is not a literal phrase.
The OP's comment was quite terse and so I asked if they wouldn't mind elaborating.
As you can see someone else replied with a more concrete example, which is all I was asking.
Your response displays a shocking level of immaturity that appears to have been triggered by your own total and complete misunderstanding.
>"Somewhere in the Linux operating system, which runs in many servers, is code that authorizes a user by verifying a typed password against a stored encrypted one. An implanted chip can alter part of that code so the server won’t check for a password—and presto! A secure machine is open to any and all users."
I realize the intended audience for this article is not a technical crowd but can someone walk me through in practical terms how such a chip might subvert the /bin/login binary?