In the mid 2000s, mortgage lenders were working with the customers, agents at countrywide for example, were helping their customers fill out documents fraudulently. (Years later a few would go to prison for this.) This was not a failure at the bottom, the system allowed those who would attempt to commit fraud, commit said fraud because they profited from it.
Or are you completely unwilling to believe that complex, and opaque systems need any kind of regulation to prevent abuse by people at all levels. And that people at the bottom of the system are the most likely to be abused by said system.
How is the normal not finance expert person supposed to navigate this? On the one hand you are supposed to believe investment advice but on the other hand you are not supposed to believe the financing advice you get when buying a house.
The financial industry wants it both ways. We have to trust them as experts when it suits them but when things go wrong it's the customer's fault.
It is pointless to say "they should have known better" because lots of people simply did not, and this had bad consequences for many who did, including people who did act responsibly, but lost their homes anyway as a consequence of this recklessness.
It is more to the point to say that the institutions and regulators should have known better.
One reason this part of the story is being overlooked is that none of the executives responsible for encouraging and facilitating irresponsible and even fraudulent lending were sanctioned in any way (maybe they had a reduced bonus one year, and had the effrontery to claim that was unfair.)
Ironically, those who walked away from mortgages they could have paid were acting as rational economic agents.
The illusion that the American business community deserves moral consideration has been used to fleece the general public for years.
> 70 percent of defaulted loans had blatant misrepresentations on their mortgage applications. The FBI estimates that mortgage fraud (by borrowers) increased 1,000 percent from 2001 to 2007.
And they defaulted strategically to make money:
> They also discovered these sorts of events—the abandonment of a mortgage obligation to pay when people were perfectly able to pay—represented fully 20 to 30 percent of the delinquencies that took place in 2007 and 2008