Right now, the way key compromise might be detected in RPKI is that a human network operator notices a signed object which is obviously suspicious and posts it on a mailing list. This is the same way that CA compromise was detected in the Web PKI before CT.
CT was useful well before Chrome used their weight to make it required for all new certificates because it was no particular burden on a few people (CA or not) who saw a lot of certificates to add them to CT. This gave the people who might not see a lot of certificates but want to find something weird a corpus to dig into.
Same idea applies to RPKI. But yes, setting up Cirrus took very little of my time.
Some small corrections if I may
1. I don't know of any issuer key compromises detected with CT. Such compromises are rare. DigiNotar is an obvious example, but can you think of any recent ones? Mostly CA incompetence is more subtle that "Oops we left the root keys on a train" and I'd hope the same is true for RIRs.
2. Technically CT is still not required. You can choose to obtain certificates which aren't logged from a CA that will issue them without logging. Neither Google nor Mozilla require you to log all certificates as a condition of their root programmes and both recently confirmed they do not intend to make that a requirement. Chrome will mark your cert as untrustworthy if it hasn't got an SCT and so it would always make sense to log certificates for a site Chrome users will access on the public Web, but not every TLS certificate is for a web site accessed with Chrome.
[ Also, Google actually makes use of the fact that certs can exist without being logged for some systems. Suppose they're about to launch amazing.example.com, but even the Amazing name would give away what it is. They can order the cert for amazing.example.com with no logging and stockpile it, and when the brass signs off on actually announcing Amazing they log this cert, almost instantly getting back SCTs, and configure a suitably modern web server to send the SCTs separately alongside the certificate. Where ordering a certificate internally might take hours or days, these final steps can be done in a few minutes and need no special permission. Any subscriber whose CA is willing to issue unlogged certificates can do this, but just make sure you have all the steps correct or you'll look really dumb, even Google got this wrong at least once since they began doing it ]
[edited to fix typo that reversed my meaning]
Not key compromise, but general mis-issuance:
Facebook detected overreach by a vendor with CT: https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/early-impac...
AGL detected certs that were malformed in various ways: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/08/01/ctpilot.html
> Technically CT is still not required.
It produces an interstitial, see: https://invalid-expected-sct.badssl.com/
I can see why they did that, CT was a huge benefit for the Web PKI and many of the things we did to the Web PKI are things they'd like to see happen for RPKI - more people using it, better technical compliance by issuers, more eyeballs on the problems, CT probably helped with some of those.
But the Web PKI is a vast sprawling mess. CT was necessary _because_ of that mess, we know we can't stop it being a mess, so we needed technology that could cope. The RPKI is neither vast, nor sprawling, nor especially messy.
A big part of what drove improvements to the Web PKI was the effort by people with the power to get things changed. In the case of the Web PKI that's Mozilla, the Mozilla community (since Mozilla is a charity) and to a lesser extent the big commercial vendors, Microsoft, Apple, Google, Oracle. CT was a _tool_ these players could use as part of that work, but on its own it didn't get the job done.
But in RPKI there isn't really an equivalent. Companies like Cloudflare don't have anywhere near the clout to get this done. Even the backbone providers don't. And if we're to expect the RIRs to fix it, they don't need any help getting insight on issuers when they themselves are the issuers.
So, Cirrus isn't hurting anything, but I hope its creators had very limited expectations and expended minimal resources getting it up, because I doubt it's a major part of the solution to our problems either.