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Re:Introducing the Librem Key by schoen on Thursday September 20, 2018 @03:42PM (#18034957)
> The Librem Key opens up possibilities for even stronger anti-interdiction protection for customers who need it. We will be able to link a Librem Key with a laptop running Heads at our facility and then ship them separately. Then when each package arrives you can immediately test for tampering with an easy “green is good, red is bad” test.

That's really neat, but I'm curious about what interdiction threat models this does or doesn't help with. For example, could the people performing the interdiction have sophisticated enough hardware-tampering capabilities that they could modify the key or extract its secrets and then send it on its way? Could they have a small enough chip that they could place in the USB connector itself to do some kind of malicious thing later on?

Re:Introducing the Librem Key by TheSpiceIsLife on Thursday September 20, 2018 @03:53PM (#18035029)
I've always assumed if you are a high-value target and a state-level actor, or a sufficiently motivated private entity, knows where high value hardware is being manufactured, or dispatched from, you ought to assume your security is already hosed. Either because they've simply tracked the delivery or tampered with it.

Are we to assume the CIA and it's ilk don't have operatives inside these organisations?

Of course, if you're sufficiently organised, you'd have low level grunts take on all the risk.

Or did staying up for way too long selling meth-amphetamine for the better part of a decade make me way too paranoid?

Re:Introducing the Librem Key by k_sze on Friday September 21, 2018 @05:58AM (#18038476)
No need to tamper with the chip, just replace the red LED with a green one.