Re:Introducing the Librem Key
by TheSpiceIsLife on Thursday September 20, 2018 @03:53PM
(#18035029)
I've always assumed if you are a high-value target and a state-level actor, or a sufficiently motivated private entity, knows where high value hardware is being manufactured, or dispatched from, you ought to assume your security is already hosed. Either because they've simply tracked the delivery or tampered with it.
Are we to assume the CIA and it's ilk don't have operatives inside these organisations?
Of course, if you're sufficiently organised, you'd have low level grunts take on all the risk.
Or did staying up for way too long selling meth-amphetamine for the better part of a decade make me way too paranoid?
That's really neat, but I'm curious about what interdiction threat models this does or doesn't help with. For example, could the people performing the interdiction have sophisticated enough hardware-tampering capabilities that they could modify the key or extract its secrets and then send it on its way? Could they have a small enough chip that they could place in the USB connector itself to do some kind of malicious thing later on?