News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Equifax IT staff had to rerun hackers' queries to work ou... by sterwill on Thursday September 20, 2018 @08:08AM (#18031642)
You can meet an at-rest encryption requirements in a lot of environments by flipping on disk-level, filesystem-level, or database-level encryption where the encryption keys aren't stored on that disk.
Re:Equifax IT staff had to rerun hackers' queries to work ou... by paul_milovanov on Saturday September 22, 2018 @10:56AM (#18046209)
Exactly. Google has a nice internal solution where data at rest is encrypted with a record-unique (or bucket-unique) key and a separate system decides whether to give you that key based on whether you give it auth tokens that entitle you to access to that record. That way, having direct access to the datastore doesn't give you automatic access to everybody's data, and all access is auditable. (And data can be "deleted" wherever it has been replicated just by deleting that key for good at the centralized key store).

Obviously, some admins/sres still need to have full access to the key store, but that can be a very small group, as compared to a situation where "every Gmail engineer can read every user's email".

Edit: on reading the summary blurb from the "translucent databases" book link that @specialist posted, what I described above is very much along those lines.