From the data presented by the tor project, it seems clear that tor services many people in nations where they're likely to be targeted by the state or other organizations for online activity.
With that said, I think defining what and whose problem it solves has a limit imposed by the nature of what we're doing, which is giving people the option to be anonymous and connect to the internet. The more details you articulate, the less effective this system becomes.
That statement is the insight that was missing for me.
It's correct, but for someone of the belief that things that work magically, necessarily also fail magically, it's hard to place faith in.
If Tor depends on a "Tinkerbell effect," I would hope its uses get the quality of scrutiny that ciphers and protocols do.
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/d73yd7/how-the-ns...
How about onion routing to peers? Tor provides a great backbone to do this yet so few applications employ it. I have ideas of course, but in general, it's very easy to have a desktop app on your home computer that fires up an onion service you can access from anywhere including mobile. Why more apps that don't have high bandwidth requirements don't use it I'll never know.
https://github.com/n8fr8/talks/blob/master/onion_things/Inte...
I tried to use the Tor browser. The problem isn't "big corporations" but speed, latency and my MacBook fans spinning when I try to read the newspaper.
That makes it sound like it is simple, but without looking at the dependencies code it might just be a simple interface to a implementation of a complex protocol.
It is all three, but it's not technical NAT hole punching as much as just connecting to relays. So any device that can call out to the internet can setup a local onion service, similar to how those localhost-to-public-address dev tunnels work.
Source for this claim? I don't doubt they monitor what they can - but the sheer volume of internet traffic makes it unlikely that they are able to monitor everything and instead must target specific things to monitor. They have a lot of money and a lot of smart people, but they don't have wizard magic.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempora
>The Guardian claims that no distinction is made in the gathering of data between public citizens and targeted suspects.
> The processing centres apply a series of sophisticated computer programmes in order to filter the material through what is known as MVR – massive volume reduction. The first filter immediately rejects high-volume, low-value traffic, such as peer-to-peer downloads, which reduces the volume by about 30%.
They have access, but it isn't necessarily analysed or kept.
(I do occasionally, but it's a bit slow for some things)
You basically add some anonymity but change your threat model to include an extremely high likelihood of injection attacks, and practically provoke every state level agency to monitor you, where they might have previously ignored you.
This was the pgp problem in the 90s where you would essentially be sending a tracer round across the network saying, "hey everyone, these two people are using encryption!"
Tor is a great effort and it gets people involved in privacy, but onion routing to exit nodes on the internet has diminishing efficacy, and I think everyone needs a clearer articulation of what and whose problem it solves.