It doesn't contradict what I previously said. The ability of actors to act game-theoretically depends on the bounds of the rationality and the complexity of the scenario. A game of chicken is much simpler than a game of chess, which in turn is much simpler than capitalism.
The multipolar trap manifests itself in real life in lots of simple ways already. The original essay has some examples, but the tragedy of the commons is the quintessential example.
The multipolar trap as a totalizing behavior is not an impossible scenario, but just currently infeasible for most sufficiently complex scenarios given the bounded reality. Which means it becomes a cause for concern as the bounds on rationality increase (through computation, through organization, etc.). That's why we should be wary of decentralized systems in the long run.
What you said was "everyone" was always acting game-theoretically already and therefore that what we currently have is game-theoretically optimal, which is what I disagreed with.
Yet now you write that everyone acting game-theoretically optimally is not actually possible.
So you were criticizing an impossible scenario?
Since I agree with you that literally everyone acting game-theoretically optimally is impossible, I took your earlier use of the concept to mean something possible, that is, everyone acting as close to game-theoretically optimally as they are capable, and used the concept in the same way.