Re:How I gained commit access to Homebrew in 30 minutes
by ddalex on Wednesday August 08, 2018 @02:44AM
(#17713682)
The 'malicious file system' on a USB stick is not something to worry about - the firmware of your USB stick is. People (ie for-fun hackers) modified firmwares on USB sticks to make them look like HID keyboards and send commands to target computers - it is well enough in the capabilities of a determined adversary to own your internet machine and implant something on your USB stick.
For secure airgapped computers I'd use one way low tech comm channels with no side bands, maybe IR or sound? (if you trust the device drivers)
Re:How I gained commit access to Homebrew in 30 minutes
by MauranKilom on Wednesday August 08, 2018 @04:13PM
(#17719034)
What happened to CD/DVD (or floppy)? Too small?
I verify that the source code being compiled is the source code which is published in a signed tarball. Yes, someone could have tampered with the internet-connected system where I do Tarsnap development, but their tampering would be visible in the source code.
Build dependencies are verified to be the packages shipped by Debian. If someone has tampered with the Debian gcc package, we've lost even without Tarsnap binary packages.
Also, how secure is the kernel on the air-gapped machine against malicious filesystems on the USB stick? (If it's running Linux, the answer is almost certainly "not;" I could imagine FreeBSD is better but I don't know how much people have explored that.)
I don't use a filesystem on the USB stick I use for sneakernet, for exactly this reason -- I write and read files to it using tar. (Yes, you can write to a USB stick as a raw device just like you would write to a tape drive.)