The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext

Re:The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext by otterley on Saturday August 04, 2018 @04:40PM (#17688341)

Thanks! So it looks like AuthorizedPrincipalsFile/AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand gives us a method for doing this. This would have to be combined with some sort of user ID management system still, like distribution of /etc/{passwd,group} files, LDAP/AD, etc.

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Re:The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext by e12e on Saturday August 04, 2018 @08:46PM (#17689127)

There's also: https://github.com/uber/pam-ussh/blob/master/README.md

https://medium.com/uber-security-privacy/introducing-the-ube...

And for the ssh ca part, bless and teleport (as others have mentioned).

There's the option of putting stuff in ad/ldap - but if you're already using ad, kerberized ssh (and sudo etc) might be the way to go.

I like the idea of a system that's simpler than ad/ldap+kerberos - and ssh certs fits most of the bill.

The challenge becomes auth/authz beyond just login - ldap basically requires ssl ca anyway - and at that point, especially with kerberos set up - I think one might be better off sticking with one complex auth/authz system rather than two...

At least it should be possible to avoid passwords with something like: https://wiki.freeradius.org/guide/2FA-Active-Directory-plus-...

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