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Re:Sequoia-PGP – A new OpenPGP implementation in Rust by jandrese on Thursday August 02, 2018 @01:30PM (#17673469)
Oh god this. GPG's commandline is so inconsistent and frustrating to use. Plus it has all of these concepts that hardly anybody cares about in real life. Like the "trust level" of a key in the system. There are 5 (maybe 6) trust levels and it would take someone really paranoid to use most of them. Of course imported keys default to the lowest (most useless) level so you have to change it, which is a pain in the ass to do from the commandline (you have to write an expect script or do a wholesale import of a "trust database").

And then there was Ubuntu 16 that couldn't seem to import private keys at all or must have required some kind of super secret commandline option to allow it.

Honestly at this point I've been waiting for the inevitable article about how GPG has been maintained by one starving guy in his basement for the past 20 years and it turns out it's a total mess and nobody noticed because nobody was looking. Basically OpenSSL all over again.

Re:Sequoia-PGP – A new OpenPGP implementation in Rust by lozf on Thursday August 02, 2018 @07:58PM (#17676410)
> Honestly at this point I've been waiting for the inevitable article about how GPG has been maintained by one starving guy in his basement for the past 20 years ...

Perhaps you missed it in 2015:

https://www.propublica.org/article/the-worlds-email-encrypti...

The current funding page is at https://gnupg.org/donate/

Re:Sequoia-PGP – A new OpenPGP implementation in Rust by Boulth on Thursday August 02, 2018 @02:21PM (#17674033)
New GnuPG can use TOFU trust model that simplifies this flow (an example here: https://www.kernel.org/category/signatures.html#using-the-we... ).

> Of course imported keys default to the lowest (most useless) level so you have to change it

You don't need to adjust trust levels, just sign the key locally (lsign) and it'll be valid. (there is a difference between key validity and trust, check out this excellent resource https://www.linux.com/learn/pgp-web-trust-core-concepts-behi... ).

Re:Sequoia-PGP – A new OpenPGP implementation in Rust by jandrese on Thursday August 02, 2018 @02:40PM (#17674214)
That article makes the Web of Trust seem like an even bigger mistake. Once you have more than handful of keys in the system the interactions become complex, too complex for good security IMHO.
Re:Sequoia-PGP – A new OpenPGP implementation in Rust by Boulth on Thursday August 02, 2018 @02:47PM (#17674283)
Does it?

For a key to be considered valid it must be either ultimately trusted, signed by ultimately trusted key or one fully trusted valid key or 3 marginally trusted valid keys.

It seems to me there are only two properties to track and quite easy calculation to do (fizz buzz level).

Re:Sequoia-PGP – A new OpenPGP implementation in Rust by jandrese on Thursday August 02, 2018 @02:57PM (#17674389)
That's already three conditions, and those spider up to the conditions above.

It's like ACLs. On the surface they seem so easy, but in practice they're a nightmare to manage because you have to track so many dependencies to figure out a simple yes/no question.

Re:Sequoia-PGP – A new OpenPGP implementation in Rust by Boulth on Thursday August 02, 2018 @03:41PM (#17674799)
There is one assigned property (trust) one relations table (signing key, signed key) and one computed property (validity, the output) and one condition.

I'd be very happy to see a simpler solution to the problem of decentralized authenticity.

Some projects do rely on Web of Trust, for example Linux kernel (https://www.kernel.org/signature.html#kernel-org-web-of-trus...) or Arch Linux (https://www.archlinux.org/master-keys/).