My advice is to never assume that someone is actively evil. People almost never think of themselves as evil. Instead, they have values to which they are attached and habits of thoughts to which they are accustomed.
You're more likely to achieve genuine understanding of another's mental processes - or empathy, as it's often called - if you start from a place of being willing to respect them. This understanding generally gives you a better appreciation of how to persuade them in a manner that will leave them with a positive impression of you afterwards.
I'm more interested in the deontic more something along the lines of the deontic idea that we should understand folks in the way that they understand themselves.
I'm with you on the idea that we shouldn't assume folks are evil and that we should always try and understand them in te way they understand themselves.
But I'm often finding myself working with and communicating with narcissistic people wholly lack that ability to see other people as having thoughts and motivations which are different from their own.
In these cases, I suppose evil is just too strong a word... there are levels of understanding people that I try to filter out, specifically the dialectic between how they understand themselves and what I should take away from that understanding.
So, at some point, I feel like we have to go beyond simply being agnostic about how people see themselves... of course we all see ourselves as driving as best we can. And we need to develop the empathy you're describing and understand the real differences between how we see things.
But beyond that, I'm having a hard time with the idea that we're all just morally neutral actors who all see ourselves as doing the best we can, and I feel like if I can better understand why we might have a real ethical obligation to respect others' epistemic situations I'll have a better understanding of my own ethics... and I guess that was what I was hoping for:
what's the underlying argument that we should attempt this ethical stance of respecting others beyond the pragmatic, utilitarian reasons that seem far more obvious.
I think when one person describes another person as evil they usually mean “this person has values to which they are attached - and those are evil values.”
"When Alice says Bob is evil, she's saying Bob is attached to some values, and those values are evil by Alice's own value system". This definition avoids calling any view objectively evil, but admits some values are evil in a given value system. That should be uncontentious.
Most of us know we often behave in ways inconsistent with our own values (because of lack of information or just personal imperfection). But when we see other people behaving in ways we think of as wrong, we’re quick to assume their behavior reflects their deepest values, instead of weakness or ignorance or normal hypocrisy.
Seems like a manifestation of the fundamental attribution error: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_attribution_erro...
Pragmatics aside (it's much easier to rhetorically persuade someone if you understand their motives and rationale), there are situations in the world where we have real disagreements about what right action looks like:
I can't support all the various epistemic situations I see in a moral sense even if I can appreciate how it's more effective.
For instance, I can understand arguing that some jackbooted thug shouldn't summarily execute a person and arguing from that thug's position ("don't kill them because you'll have to do paperwork" or some such thing), but intuitively I don't feel like I have an obligation to respect that person's process and thoughts.
In that case, it seems okay to be "manipulative" in the sense of your quote.
But maybe not... Intuitively, I think that there has to be a good reason for this goal, and I feel like it is a goal I work towards (and yeesh, it takes a lot of real work on all parts of my identity and awareness), but I also feel like there are boundaries for that goal.
Is there a larger ethical take away or underwriting rationale in your moral compass for why we should "respect others' episteme"?