Re:Detecting the use of "curl | bash" server-side
by twr on Sunday July 29, 2018 @02:25AM
(#17636810)
Linux/BSD distribution mirrors don't control the package signing keys, maintainers do. Similarly, Google doesn't possess the ability to push out updates for third-party apps, without fundamentally redesigning the OS with a platform update, because the signing keys are owned by the app developers, and the existing OS rejects updates signed with different keys. In both of these situations, the key owners lack the ability to selectively push out signed updates, unless they also control the distribution infrastructure.
Re:Detecting the use of "curl | bash" server-side
by ajanuary on Sunday July 29, 2018 @06:30AM
(#17637378)
The argument is predicated in the assumption that some subset of people are checking the installer before running it, whether that installer be a shell script or a binary package.
With the binary packages you don’t have any way to tell if the consumer is going to inspect it or not, so even if you send the malicious code to only a subset of people, there is a risk of detection.
The technique in the post allows you to distribute the malicious code only to people who aren’t inspecting it with a much higher success rate.
Personally I’m dubious that anyone is inspecting any installers with enough expertise and scrutiny to protect the rest of us, so the differences between the install methods in this regard are negligible.
Either you trust the entity you're downloading software from or you don't.