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Re:Email encryption is here – use STARTTLS everywhere by fowl2 on Saturday July 28, 2018 @12:54AM (#17631616)
So this is kinda like the HSTS preload list, but includes MX server names, and is supposed to be updated every 48 hours.

Couldn't we just put this in DNS?

Re:Email encryption is here – use STARTTLS everywhere by sydli on Saturday July 28, 2018 @01:09AM (#17631656)
That would be fine, too, and reflects in part what MTA-STS is trying to do.

A point that may be obvious, but I would like to make explicit, is that unlike on web, end-users have no good way to express whether they prefer security over deliverability on a connection, which makes downgrade attacks more difficult to deal with. Everyone defaults to preferring deliverablity (falling back to plaintext). In the absence of user intent, it's more important for an email sender to know the recipient mailserver's intent: what level of security should they expect? This can be achieved at varying degrees through DANE, MTA-STS, or a "HSTS Preload List" equivalent for email, but there is currently no reliably deployed standard for this.

(edit: something I forgot to mention: of course, you'd have to trust the initial DNS lookup as well)

Re:Email encryption is here – use STARTTLS everywhere by fowl2 on Sunday July 29, 2018 @10:41PM (#17641685)
What would be more/also interesting would be a way of expressing this intent by a sender.

Seems like (with absolutely no thought here) a new header could me minted for this - eg. "Transport-Security: Require". Tough part as usual would be getting MTA and client support, but switching to a per message approach would at least allow incremental rollout - and critically I think - allow introspection by following bounces.