You can't have it both ways.
You either get reproducible builds (by default with vgo, by adding lock files in other systems) or you get silent upgrades that potentially fix security issues (but also potentially introduce security issues).
You also mis-characterize the position of vgo creator. He doesn't think that lock files are a huge issue per se.
The difference is in default behavior of the system: vgo by default picks predictable, consistent version of dependencies. That version doesn't change if dependencies release new versions.
In fact, it's not just the default behavior but the only behavior.
Other systems allow specifying complex rules for which version of dependency to pick and they all allow for a scenario where you run the same algorithm over the same rules but pick different version because in the meantime some dependency has released a new version.
It's such a big problem that all those system end up introducing lock files, which is a tacit admission that what vgo does by default is a good idea.
vgo doesn't need lock files to get the benefit of lock files, which is a nice cherry on top but the real advancement is in changing the default behavior of how resolving versions of dependencies work.
That is the great thing about lock files. You don't have to check them in. If you want reproducible builds, you do check them in. If you don't, you don't. The user, not the package manager, gets to make this choice on a case-by-case basis.
> The difference is in default behavior of the system: vgo by default picks predictable, consistent version of dependencies. That version doesn't change if dependencies release new versions.
And that right there is the problem. You don't get the latest version unless you explicitly ask for it. This makes the user do what a package manager is perfectly capable of doing. It thrusts the problem onto the user instead of applying a well-known solution that was causing problems for nobody.
If you are writing an application, don't you want your transitive dependencies to get security fixes without having to trawl through the tree?
And how does it guarantee that this actually results in anything that works, if upper bounds are not supported?
That's really interesting. Obviously this would lead to fewer regressions, but it seems opposed to the "security problems fixed for free" scenario you hear about with other package dependency schemes. Were we all just imagining that scenario? Is there another way we should be handling vulnerabilities, i.e. by "repudiating" old versions rather than simply releasing new ones? Then you could have something like "Minimal Unrepudiated Version Selection".