Since this was before 911 - the 'terrorists' in question were presumably the IRA, not sure they had much of an online presence back then.
You do know that 9/11 was not the first terrorist attack on the US by Islamic extremists, do you?
The fact that their plans would be written in a foreign language (never mind a foreign alphabet) would have been more than adequate to keep it secret from British intelligence.
ps. You do know that we have been having terrorist attacks for almost a century.
This is one of the stupidest statements I have ever seen.
Plus, in my experience, Arabic is a difficult language for people who grew up speaking romance languages to learn. Perhaps not as difficult as Japanese, but still much more difficult than German or French.
That's probably where they get them.
We may have a stifling bureaucracy and an overstretched military, but at least the British Foreign Office actually has local knowledge and people who speak the language.
Yes, there are going to be gray areas. But if Bob has one computer in his house with his and only his finger prints all over it, wear that indicates that the computer has been used extensively, and the computer hard drive is filled with an encryption scheme wrapped around otherwise useless gigabytes of random data, then I am sure beyond a reasonable doubt that there is encrypted data on the hard drive and Bob has the key.
1. Bob has mischievous friends, or worse, enemies at school. He leaves his laptop unattended/exposed where someone installs the encryption then wipes their fingerprints, or perhaps has worn gloves. Bob takes his laptop home and tries to regain access to the computer.
2. Bob unwittingly acquires the laptop from a criminal (he may have bought it, or maybe he fixes computers) who encrypted the drive and wiped away all fingerprints. Bob tries to gain access to the computer.
To be free from self-incrimination Bob can simply refuse to answer any questions about the laptop in question at all.
Remember; reasonable doubt is not just the production of an alternate theory, it requires legitimate evidence to verify.
Both the example theories you cite would usually be easy to disprove as well. The first because you could look at various aspects of activity on the computer either side of the creation of the encrypted file and show that it resembles their usual activity (for example, there are numerous other ways to do it).
Now, this is where it gets clunky. I'm speculating here, but from direct experience so... take it with caution.
If you're under investigation for something and refuse to hand over a password then you're unlikely to automatically go to jail over it. The case that probably exists is that there is evidence to support the accusation, but no actual images/material. The latter is needed for a prosecution to succeed. I've never seen a case that looks like a blank go as far as demanding encryption keys - unless you are insanely careful there will always be traces left outside the encrpted file.
(BTW, Pro Tip - if you want to be secure from investigation, scrap windows (it logs way too much) and switch to Linux. Much of the forensics stuff is Windows focused so you instantly throw the [get the right file system and the main forensic tools won't even recognise it...]. Couple that with encrypted containers and you're on to a winner)
>One of the earliest attempts to quantify reasonable doubt was a 1971 article by Rita Simon and Linda Mahan, "Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom." In a later analysis of the question ("Distributions of Interest for Quantifying Reasonable Doubt and Their Applications," 2006[10]) , three students at Valparaiso University presented a trial to groups of students. Half of the students decided the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The other half recorded their perceived likelihood, given as a percentage, that the defendant committed the crime. They then matched the highest likelihoods of guilt with the guilty verdicts and the lowest likelihoods of guilt with the innocent verdicts. From this, the researchers gauged that the cutoff for reasonable doubt fell somewhere between the highest likelihood of guilt matched to an innocent verdict and the lowest likelihood of guilt matched to a guilty verdict. From these samples, they concluded that the standard was between 0.70 and 0.74.
This is a really subtle point, but in the US this is not (usually) the case, because this is still self-incrimination. You see, by entering the password, you are demonstrating that you have access to the encrypted information, and demonstrating that you have that power is technically self-incrimination. The password is one piece of information that you can't be compelled to divulge, and the fact that you have the password is a separate piece of information, and you cannot be compelled to reveal either. This is also a really important piece of information too, because in order to stick you with any legal consequences associated with the encrypted information, they generally have to prove that you have control over or access to the information. If a file is encrypted it is still possible to reasonably doubt that you have access to its contents despite having access to the physical drive it is on.
While it is (currently, as far as I am aware) untested in the court of law, it may be possible to compel someone to use or divulge their password if this does not incriminate the person to do this. I can think of two ways this could happen: a) access/control to the encrypted information has already been proven, so the testimony is of null value b) the prosecution is not allowed to use the fact that you know the password in court, and takes the gamble that they can prove access/control some other way (possibly by using contents of the information).
This is, of course, assuming that passwords are classified as "testimony" and therefore protected by the 5th Amendment. If the password is ever recorded on a physical medium such as a piece of paper, that piece of paper is probably not testimony, but rather evidence. This means that, like the key to a safe, it is protected by the 4th Amendment rather than the 5th, and you can be compelled to give up the paper via a warrant. This presents quite a quandary in deciding which is more secure: a 16-character semi-mnemonic memorizable sequence, or a 128-character random sequence that must be stored on a USB stick?
(IANAL, but I've studied the topic as a layman)
Considering that the record for number of decimal places memorized for Pi appears to be 67,890 I'd argue memorizing a 128-character random sequence would be both possible and most secure. ;)
"but the Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included,
applied the Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper
acquisition or use of evidence which, in the Court's view, did not
involve compelled testimonial self-incrimination of some sort."
"The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by
asserting that the item of evidence which he is required to pro-
duce contains incriminating writing, whether his own or that of
someone else"
"The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclu-
sion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of
the Government's information by conceding that he in fact has the
papers. Under these circumstances by enforcement of the summons
'no constitutional rights are touched. The question is not of
testimony but of surrender.'"
Fisher largely overturned the earlier (1886) Boyd decision. The court did not expand the Fisher limits until 2000, when the Hubbell decision expanded the testimonial aspect of production and limited the scope of the "foregone conclusion" rationale. For more on the act of production privilege, see http://www.georgemasonlawreview.org/doc/17-3_Cowen.pdfBut this all relies on a particularly narrow reading of the role of the password in these questions. You have no right (Boyd being long overturned) to withhold physical evidence that may incriminates you.
Anyway, this is an interesting area of law and definitely worth watching.
Apparently, this situation is not yet resolved, but is currently being tested.
http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2009/03/5th-amendment-bummer....
http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2010/04/passwords-and-5th-ame...
I agree though - the entire thing is an absurdly mucky business. Apparently however the English law doesn't have much like that in the way of loopholes, or he simply refused to decrypt it outright.
This has been floated in the US before, but it has not gotten good PR. As it stands now, it is a Constitutional law issue -- does the fifth amendment mean that you can't be compelled to get up in the witness box and talk, or does it mean that you don't have to assist the prosecution in any way? Right now, the courts seem to be split 50/50, but I feel that practicality dictates that you don't have to give up your key. First they have to accuse you of a crime and bring it to trial, then you have to refuse to decrypt the key, then the first trial has to stop, then the government has to prove that you know the key, then you have to be convicted and sentenced, then you can go back to the original trial after analyzing all of the decrypted "evidence". If encryption becomes widespread, this just isn't practical. It's easy to prove that you sell drugs; someone goes up to you and buys them. It's not easy to prove that you didn't forget your encryption key, because we have no way to observe someone's mind. Laws that prohibit crimes that can't be proved tend not to do well.
While it's a dubious law in may ways, when you hear a UK politician calling for longer detention without trial and stating needing to break encryption you can at least point to this law and say that their claims about longer detention are nonsense.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Boucher
On February 19, 2009, Judge Sessions reversed the
magistrate's ruling and directed Boucher "to provide an
unencrypted version of the Z drive viewed by the ICE agent.It'd be similar to confessing to murder, telling the cops where the body is, and then invoking your right to remain silent, and expecting them not to look for the body under "fruit of the poisonous tree" logic.
This is really common advice, but I'm not sure it's the best option.
As a practical matter, I've wondered what would happen if someone simply claimed they couldn't remember the password. Especially if one could make it look like the encrypted files hadn't been accessed in over a year.
TrueCrypt's Plausible Deniability (http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability) makes these issues even more complicated.
But yeah: by simply refusing, you'd be thrown in jail for contempt and your only way out would be appellate review of the order. You'd have to challenge the contempt citation on the basis that the original order was unlawful.