Re:US breaks up IRS phone scam operation
by walrus01 on Tuesday July 24, 2018 @12:32AM
(#17598129)
Fixing ss7 at this point would be like polishing the brass doorknobs on the Titanic.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
This is a good analogy unfortunately. SMS is the worst culprit there from my standpoint, given companies use it to send short term credentials (yes they do...) or for 2fa.
I either disagree or am ignorant about SS7. See my other post on this page. Interested to read others thoughts about implementing a "opt-in, call back only or GTFO system".
If I have full control of a DID, implementing callback isn't hard. That would be a bandaid type solution built on top of the existing phone network, however. Fixing ss7 at a systemic level so that all call routing in and outbound is verifiable, CID spoofing is impossible, is what is nigh impossible.
Re:US breaks up IRS phone scam operation
by supertrope on Tuesday July 24, 2018 @10:12AM
(#17601156)
Are there any proposed replacements? Even SIP has vulnerabilities, foot gun features, and fundamental design problems like use of MD5 digest, NAT intolerance, and vendor and device specific bugs.