Re:Practical homomorphic encryption over integers (2017)
by betterunix2 on Monday July 23, 2018 @10:23PM
(#17597663)
You need more than FHE for that; just because I cannot see what I am computing does not mean I will compute the answer correctly. There are ways this can be resolved but it pushes practicality even further back.
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Re:Practical homomorphic encryption over integers (2017)
by chaboud on Tuesday July 24, 2018 @02:02AM
(#17598479)
Is it not practical to just saddle the dataset and compute request with a canary payload that is easily computable by the requestor?
If one can spoof the canary payload effectively, one would have broken the FHE scheme, probabilistically, right?
Unless I'm thinking about this wrong, the FH part of FHE makes this a pretty solvable problem. Is this not already fundamental to any FHE scheme?
Re:Practical homomorphic encryption over integers (2017)
by betterunix2 on Wednesday July 25, 2018 @12:45PM
(#17610655)
Maybe in some cases that is possible, but it is also possible that your function requires as much time to verify as the FHE evaluator would spend on (honestly) computing the result. In other words it would make outsourcing pointless; this is briefly discussed in the related work section of this paper:
https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/202.pdf
You also have to be careful to ensure that the canary cannot be identified in the plaintext; otherwise the evaluator can homomorphically identify the canary (i.e. it can compute the canary values honestly and cheat everywhere else).
Re:Practical homomorphic encryption over integers (2017)
by dlubarov on Monday July 23, 2018 @11:26PM
(#17597906)
Not sure what you mean? Correct evaluation (modulo some negligible error) is part of the usual FHE definition.
Re:Practical homomorphic encryption over integers (2017)
by tylersmith on Monday July 23, 2018 @11:53PM
(#17598002)
You can't evaluate the correctness/trust the result without performing the computation yourself or receiving a proof of correctness, e.g. a SNARK.