> if you have a dictatorship, you can require that your CA remains trusted
How?
I mean, I suppose you could mandate that all computers sold in your country come preinstalled with state-approved monitoring software. But barring that, what's going to stop users from downloading the latest version of Firefox which includes code marking your CA as untrusted?
A police baton
Used against whom? The Firefox/Chrome/Microsoft/Linux developers don't live under your dictatorship.
Re:Emacs and TLS
by Fukkaudeku on Friday July 20, 2018 @09:38AM
(#17574851)
The people who sell the computers in your country.
Re:Emacs and TLS
by move-on-by on Friday July 20, 2018 @11:36AM
(#17575855)
Like I said, the burden at that point is on the users
Well, this is awkward - Chrome has deprecated HPKP in favor of a new header: 'Expect-CT' [1]. The new header requires any cert to have a valid certificate transparency log entry and has reporting features as well [2]. This is slightly different - the scenario above would be allowed to happen and would be be valid, but that it would be logged publicly. Whatever CA (dictatorships) had issued the cert would lose their trusted status. But then again, if you have a dictatorship, then you can require that your CA remains trusted and the burden of removing trust to your dictatorship CA would be on individual users.
[1]: https://www.zdnet.com/article/google-chrome-is-backing-away-... [2]: https://scotthelme.co.uk/a-new-security-header-expect-ct/