Paraconsistent logic allows contradicting statements to be held without implying one must be true or the other.

Why would there obviously be more feminist bank tellers than female bank tellers? What if there's a cultural connection that guides both decisions to be made together?

Don't people aggregate personality details in clusters by choice in order to be accepted via conformity? Isn't that the principle recommendation engines operate on fundamentally?

No! You still aren't paying attention and at this point I think you might be just trolling, but here's one more good faith response.

To reiterate, the article brings up the interesting result that people think it's more likely that someone is a "feminist bank teller" than that she is a "bank teller".

To be clear there are some number of bank tellers, and of them, some are feminist. There cannot be more people who are feminist and bank tellers than people who are simply bank tellers. The feminist ones are a subset of all bank tellers.

So the probability that someone is both is less than or equal to the probability that someone is just a bank teller. If you know them well, and they go to marches and such and your ascertain that they are definitely feminist, then the probability that they are both is equal to (but not greater) than the probability that they're a bank teller.

Honestly if I try to explain my reasoning, it's just a waste of energy at this point. Behavior, people, you can't predict it. You can't predict thoughts people have. Can't infer intent for why people use one pedantic example to illustrate a point over another.