Right. From a purely material standpoint, I agree that from the outside perspective, there are two identical MEs and any claims to legitimacy, originality, or specialness will be completely dubious.

But I think it's easy to demonstrate that it would not be like waking up and the "true original" would definitely die in that it would not experience the clone's consciousness

> it's easy to demonstrate that it would not be like waking up

Really? How would you demonstrate that?

If you do not believe the parent of your last comment does so I would like to hear your thoughts

Imagine that we have the technology to cryogenically freeze and revive you with your subjective sense of self intact. Now consider two scenarios:

Scenario 1: We freeze you, move your body to a different location, and revive you.

Scenario 2: We freeze you, make an atomic copy of the frozen version of you, move the copy to a new location, and revive the copy.

(The reason I want to freeze you rather than simply anesthetize you is that I want there to be no possibility of any physical changes to your body or brain while you are unconscious.)

Unless you are a dualist, you must concede that your external behavior after being revived must be the same in both scenarios. So any experiment we do on you must have the same outcome in both scenarios. So no experiment can determine whether your subjective sense of self is the same or different in the two scenarios.