That's not the case at all, and a very dangerous idea. Some steps drive increased centralization. Increased centralization makes interception and filtering easier.
The better solution is to push domain authentication to after the secure channel is established. That doesn't protect against active MITM snoopers, but neither does TLS ESNI. Worse, TLS ESNI will drive people to use centralized DNS-over-TLS service providers.
Mozilla+Cloudflare's "free" DNS service barely made it out of the gate before it was hijacked by the Great Firewall (not even simply blocked). See https://borncity.com/win/2018/05/30/cloudflare-dns-service-1... and https://blog.cloudflare.com/bgp-leaks-and-crypto-currencies/
Of course, with DNS-over-TLS you would know (maybe) that there was a MITM. But that's no different than DNSSEC. And there's nothing you could do about it, anyhow.
Securing DNS, and specifically keeping DNS queries private, is NOT a solved problem. Indeed, it's not even a solvable problem because of the nature of DNS--the need to centrally coordinate registration of human readable identifiers. The only real "solution" is anonymization via techniques like onion routing (e.g. Tor), which anonymizes the requester, not the responder.
Advocates will tell you that TLS ESNI improves requester anonymity by aggregating users behind "trusted" intermediate resolvers, but that's largely based on conjecture and very little evidence--in particular without any showing that usage patterns won't naturally reconfigure to either return everybody to the status quo ante, or make everybody worse off on average.
TLS ESNI is a wild goose chase and, looking back 10 years from now, will have simply served to increase the complexity of the web stack and decrease service and software diversity.
Corporations and governments have to balance the costs and the benefits of breaking encryption. The costs have increased, which increases the chance that they decide that the costs outweigh any perceived benefits.