The logical extension would not be "there should be no security features", and this is obvious, because the whole problem was not the existence of security features. The problem was the lack of ability to enforce policies, which organizations (companies, governments) are often required to do. I think the logical extension should be that security features should be developed with policy enforcement capabilities in mind.
Also, it's not logical to conflate this privacy feature with security features. Secure connections do not require SNI hiding at all. DNS-over-HTTPS is closer to a security feature, because without enabling DNSSEC, exploits are possible to the DNS which can impact non-TLS connections. That has a much easier workaround, which is to point DNS-over-HTTPS to a local provider.
There's no "quiet" in this approach. The cert vendors do not have the certificate's private keys; all the server operators send to the cert vendors is the certificate's public keys. Therefore, the only way to listen on the secured connections through a cert vendor is to use the cert vendor's private keys to sign a counterfeit certificate, which is presented to the browser. And at this point, the browser has everything it needs to prove that the cert vendor was compromised.
There are also several other gotchas: Certificate Transparency can force them to publish their counterfeit certificates to the whole world; Extended Validation is allowed only from some cert vendors (and requires Certificate Transparency); and last but not least, this (like all MITM) breaks client authentication (client certificates).
Finally, this only applies to cert vendors under the USA jurisdiction. A NSL has no power over other countries.
And as you say, browsers today might not check these things (and checking CAA doesn't make much sense for a browser, it's intended to be checked by certificate issuers). But future browsers, browsers customized with some third-party extensions, or non-browsers might check.
Browsers don't and can't check CAA records, because that's not how CAA is supposed to work. CAA is only enforced at the time of issuance. If you temporarily switch your CAA records to allow issuance for an hour, issue a cert, then switch them back to block all issuance from all CAs, the cert you issued remains valid.
[1]: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!msg/ct-poli...
[2]: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=506227
The logical extension of this line of thinking is that the tech community should never provide any extra security to anyone, in case somewhere some malicious actor is angered into retaliating against a certain group of users.
If you think that there are companies that rely on surveilling DNS requests (but don't already intercept and decrypt all their employee's web traffic) then you can campaign for browsers and OSes to have an option to turn off new security features like DNS-over-HTTPS/TLS and Encrypted SNI, but please don't demand that the whole internet go without these basic protections because of the internal policies of a few corporations.