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Re:GitHub mirror compromise incident report by noobermin on Wednesday July 04, 2018 @02:54PM (#17458857)
This wasn't the code base (save the systemd stuff which increasingly is not being used by gentoo users), it was merely a github mirror.
Re:GitHub mirror compromise incident report by akerl_ on Wednesday July 04, 2018 @03:16PM (#17458969)
It was the codebase. It's mirrors, but if the attacker had been less subtle the code have pushed smaller changes instead of force-pushing, anybody using the mirror would have pulled those changes down.

Suggesting that this is "merely" a mirror downplays how seriously a more sneaky attacker could have harmed users of the project. Would similar statements downplaying the attack be made if this had been https://mirrors.kernel.org/ ?

Re:GitHub mirror compromise incident report by swsieber on Thursday July 05, 2018 @01:21AM (#17461028)
The wouldn't have even had to push smaller changes - there are ways in git to do a commit that basically overwrites the current state of the branch, but doesn't require a force push. We use it where I work when promoting branches (e.g. to production branch) so that we never ever have to worry about merge conflicts or force pushing. It's a merge strategy that basically says "When merging, just use parent 1, and pretend parent 2 doesn't exist when calculating files, etc."
Re:GitHub mirror compromise incident report by Hello71 on Wednesday July 04, 2018 @10:13PM (#17460485)
actually it would be much less bad if it was. Gentoo GPG verification still doesn't work quite right, but most users of the kernel for critical purposes do GPG verification.