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Re:Filezilla installer is suspicious again by mirimir on Saturday June 23, 2018 @09:32PM (#17384469)
Honorable providers, for example the Tor and MPTCP projects, run their own repositories, with GnuPG-authenticated packages. You get up-to-date builds, with no crap.
Re:Filezilla installer is suspicious again by gregmac on Sunday June 24, 2018 @10:21AM (#17386654)
So long as the provider remains honorable. If they decided to bundle malicious programs -- or someone who took control if their domain and private key did -- they easily could.

They could publish updates to the program, publish new dependencies, or even publish updates to packages you normally get from your main distro repository. If you're doing apt-get update (or equivalent) how closely do you scrutinize the list of changes?

Re:Filezilla installer is suspicious again by mirimir on Sunday June 24, 2018 @04:54PM (#17388334)
Yes. You gotta trust the provider.
Re:Filezilla installer is suspicious again by shawnz on Sunday June 24, 2018 @09:07AM (#17386402)
But this negates the advantage of having a small number of trusted repos if you need to add third-party repos for every project.
Re:Filezilla installer is suspicious again by mirimir on Sunday June 24, 2018 @05:04PM (#17388382)
Sure. And it's a tradeoff. The Tor and MPTCP projects came to mind, because I trust them. And there aren't many others that I trust.

My problem is that I prefer Debian stable, which is very conservative about package updates. But sometimes I end up using Ubuntu, because its repo includes newer packages.

Also, my core systems do not include anything except stable Debian. I only use third-party repos in project-specific VMs. I even use Oracle's MySQL Workbench in an Ubuntu VM. And even Windows 10 VMs, when I need Excel or other Windows-only apps. That is, compartmentalization.