Re:Don’t Let Facebook, or Any Tracker, Follow You on the Web
by jandrese on Wednesday June 13, 2018 @10:25PM
(#17308766)
There is also Panopticlick
My only complaint is that if you have canvas fingerprint randomization turned on it still counts as unique.
Re:Don’t Let Facebook, or Any Tracker, Follow You on the Web
by jerheinze on Wednesday June 13, 2018 @10:34PM
(#17308812)
> My only complaint is that if you have canvas fingerprint randomization turned on it still counts as unique.
It's not a good idea to randomize it, see the Tor Browser design document for more details https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#finge...
Re:Don’t Let Facebook, or Any Tracker, Follow You on the Web
by jandrese on Thursday June 14, 2018 @01:12AM
(#17309465)
I was referring to WebGL and Canvas fingerprinting there, which the document seems to be in favor of, although they return a single value instead of a randomized value--presumably so all TOR browsers will look the same and muddy the data.
At any rate, a randomized canvas or WebGL fingerprint shouldn't be very useful for tracking a particular browser.
Re:Don’t Let Facebook, or Any Tracker, Follow You on the Web
by jerheinze on Thursday June 14, 2018 @12:05PM
(#17312642)
Read the "Strategies for Defense: Randomization versus Uniformity" part.
Re:Don’t Let Facebook, or Any Tracker, Follow You on the Web
by jandrese on Thursday June 14, 2018 @07:06PM
(#17316157)
Most of their drawbacks to randomization apply to uniformity too, other than sites changing behavior due to your randomization. Uniformity has the big drawback of making it apparent that you're using the Tor browser, which is a red flag in some cases. At the very least it invites extra scrutiny. It's a strange design decision in my opinion to announce to loudly that a visitor is using the Tor browser when they presumably want to attract as little attention as possible.
That's not true, see all the values that can be used to fingerprint a browser: https://fpcentral.tbb.torproject.org/fp https://browserprint.info https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#finge...