News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Intel SA-00145: Lazy FP State Restore by pcwalton on Wednesday June 13, 2018 @08:44PM (#17308334)
There are limits to Site Isolation. For example, due to document.domain, subdomains of a domain cannot generally be protected from one another.

kentonv is correct that giving up on intra-process security entirely is an ominous sign.

Re:Intel SA-00145: Lazy FP State Restore by gpderetta on Friday June 15, 2018 @03:23AM (#17318082)
What we need is the equivalent of inter process isolation for intraprocess sandboxes, i.e. an hardware solution (hopefully this time not affected by Meltdown).

And we might already have it. Thanks to virtualization hardware, it should be possible for a process to own and handle its own private page table mapping completely from userspace [1].

Switching from the sandboxed code to the sandboxing code might be more expensive than a plain function call, but still way faster than IPC.

[1] For example, libDune (https://github.com/ramonza/dune), which admittedly seems a dead project. Also it requires OS support.