Re:Intel SA-00145: Lazy FP State Restore
by niftich on Wednesday June 13, 2018 @07:44PM
(#17308014)
Speculative execution isn't an inherent security risk, but it typically entails a cache fill, which can, if not cleaned up or not isolated, can be used for a timing attack. That's the real issue here: that execution results in mutating a shared datastore, and facts about the likely contents of that datastore can be inferred from performing additional operations and self-measuring aspects of one's own performance.
In the larger sense, mixing various privilege levels on shared hardware is likely a bad idea, despite being fundamental to general-purpose computing. This is because it's fairly difficult to cloak intrinsic "physical" attributes of execution, like execution timing, cache timing, from other processes, and essentially impossible (and/or unreasonable) to cloak it from one's own process. It is both possible for a process to generate lots of side-effects (e.g. IO, cache fill), and for it or another process to try to figure out ways the shared state changes by observing its own execution.
In the larger sense, mixing various privilege levels on shared hardware is likely a bad idea, despite being fundamental to general-purpose computing. This is because it's fairly difficult to cloak intrinsic "physical" attributes of execution, like execution timing, cache timing, from other processes, and essentially impossible (and/or unreasonable) to cloak it from one's own process. It is both possible for a process to generate lots of side-effects (e.g. IO, cache fill), and for it or another process to try to figure out ways the shared state changes by observing its own execution.