If you want to say 'Santa Claus doesn't exist', you can't write a formula ~E x. x=Santa Claus. Because then you are conceding in your logic that some object Santa Claus exists.
So there is some connection between the structure of sentences we can construct in our logic and metaphysical claims. We should then try to understand differences in metaphysical claims by finding differences in logics.
The author then tries to show this for the metaphysical claim, 'Statements are true or false independent of whether they can be verified.' Instead of arguing about what is truth, what does it mean for a proposition to be verified. We can instead as about the differences in the logic. Because to even talk about truth and existence we need a logic first.
So don't think there is a claim that choice of logic forces claims about real world existence. I think is the more subtle connection, that choice of logic forces a choice about rules of inference.
Real world claims would need to be based on introducing propositions (which are independent of the logic?) and then using rules of inference (which are dependent on the logic).
Your Santa Claus example helped me understand why the Herbrand universe is only useful if you restrict yourself to clauses (disjunctions under universal quantification). The Herbrand universe consists of all objects one has named (and objects one can form with function symbols, but we have none of those here), so it must necessarily falsify "~E x. x = Santa Claus". It's easy to find a model where this statement is true (take the empty universe, or the universe which contains only the Tooth Fairy), but there is no model of this statement in the Herbrand universe.
If you only want to talk about physical things, you may be able to get away with existential qualification. If you also want to deal with concepts like Santa Claus you probably have to be more sophisticated because now »exists« is an overloaded term in your domain and throwing the same existential qualifiers in front of everything won't yield results that can be meaningfully translated to statements about the world.
In the end you have the world, you have a model of the world in your logic, and you have some kind of mapping between the world and your model, most likely even on a meta level. Not only do objects in your logic have to be related to objects in the world, but the very structure of your logic, its inference rules, the allowed constructs, and so on, have to map to some of the structure of how the world works. So as I said, it should come at no surprise that differences in logic have to be equated with differences in the world you are modelling, but the real significance of that, if any, is still beyond me.
A formalist would have no problem using a logical system that implies a particular belief about existence while not holding that belief at all.
Most if not all people would would certainly agree that the idea or concept of »Santa Claus« exists in some way. But when you qualify it with »Platonic« you are implying - intentionally or not - a quite specific view about the nature of abstract objects and that will decrease the number of people agreeing with this statement substantially.
But I do see how it could be confused with platonic love, albeit I'm comfortable using it without clarification in the appropriate contexts. You're right, in German all nouns are capitalized.
If you simply meant to say that the idea of Santa Claus obviously "exists" in some sense, thus it's valid to compare our experiences with that idea, then I agree with the comment saying a lot of people would agree with you, but "platonic" is ambiguous at best.
If you really did mean to imply that an ideal Santa Claus literally exists in a literal universe of perfect ideal forms, out of which everything in our universe emerges as an imperfect projection, then I agree with the other part of the comment saying you'll find much less agreement with that claim.
My comment was that the loss of capitalization and the loss of the word's original meaning are independent phenomena. I.e. the adjective "Platonic" is often being used in the diluted sense of "conceptual" or "mental image of", and that has nothing to do with capitalization.
In philosophy, this is "Platonic Realism" quite different from "platonic", the lower case helps convey information. You make a mistake by assuming "platonic" explicitly conveys "Platonic Realism", given there are many "Platonic *" theories, such as "Platonic Idealism". Because of the ambiguity, as you correctly acknowledge, you are expected to understand it as the wikipedia article on "Platonic" suggests (as some sort of abstract object): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platonic
"Plato's influence on Western culture was so profound that several different concepts are linked by being called "Platonic" or Platonist, for accepting some assumptions of Platonism, but which do not imply acceptance of that philosophy as a whole."
And that is of course why I interpreted the combination of »platonic« and »Santa Claus« as hinting at Platonic Realism, because of the implied relation to the ideas of Plato and the example of »Santa Claus« as an abstract idea. Are there any other parts to his work were »Santa Claus« could be a relevant example but that is not related to his theory of ideal forms?
Also »Platonic Realism« and »Platonic Idealism« are, as far as I can tell, the same thing. »Platonic Realism« seems to be the common term, »Platonic Idealism« seems to be a less frequently used term with its origin in the fact that Plato called his abstract objects ideal forms.
Does not support that the "Platonic" is Platonic Realism, which is what your chief claim is and what it would implicate if the term conveyed acceptance of the entire philosophy. It merely means the acceptance of an ontology of abstractions—which is implicit when there is discussion of it, otherwise how would it be discussed?
Even if you believe Platonic Idealism and Realism are the same (which is usually meant to designate the classification between 'soft' and 'hard' Platonism), there are even different Platonic periods.
Nonetheless, it's clear that I didn't communicate this well if I'm in this conversation. Which I don't think is irrational since my discussions are usually restricted to academic contexts where this usage is ostensibly vernacular.
If that is indeed the case, I would tend to disagree. While we often think of logic as a provider of undisputable truth, I am not sure that this is justified. There is more than one type of logic and they lead to different conclusions or contradict each other in the general case. Therefore it seems to me that the obvious thing to say is that logic is a human construct we use to reason about the world, it does not reflect universal truths but was invented and constructed in a way to be useful to deal with our world.
In consequence it is obviously very likely that logic and metaphysics are strongly correlated, but that would hardly be any deep insight but just a consequence of the way we constructed or choose the logic we use. If the logic I use to deal with the world makes a prediction about the world, for example the existence of a certain entity, then that entity might actually exist if may logic is a good match for the world, but I see no reason why the entity would have to exists, my logic could just be a bad choice.