Proof of stake (still problematic for very small cap) or proof of ID (my favorite) using something like the e-estonia crypto ID system. You can prove every miner is a unique person, award them coins on a deterministic pseudo-random order.
I like crypto, but the greatest danger of it seems to be the potential for economic enslavement(we don't like you, therefore you can't buy bread anymore) through censorship and oppression.
If you are worried about targeted censorship, I seem to recall from the first days of BTC that there are ways to "shuffle" IDs: participate in a pool P, get a new ID that is untraceable to the original one but that is traceable to pool P and offers the guarantee that there are no duplicates.
But note that no cryptocurrency is "censorship-resistant" (I am of the opinion that financial transactions are not free speech, so calling it censorship is not the appropriate word and confuses issues). BTC can be (and has, in China) be forbidden. Forbid mining, jail people who do it. Easy in a country that bans also VPNs and Tor.
BTC is only as strong as Tor is and Tor is dependent on the governmental goodwill to let people use strong crypto. Keep in mind that until 2000 US companies were banned from exporting crypto tools that the NSA could not break [1] and even to this date, restrictions exist for some material and countries. USA is just one executive order away from making Tor, VPNs, and thus, anonymous BTC mining, illegal.
And I think that many countries will ban BTC. China is more energy-constrained than most of us, but the energy needs of the BTC netword is gargantuan. I think they have a year to solve that issue (I think they will use proof-of-stake) before states starts pulling the plug.
And always remember that as cool as crypto is as a tech, it does not exist in the vacuum. While it allows to navigate against an incompetent but permissive state, it does not fare well against a competent hostile one.
A part of the problem of maintaining cryptocurrencies (or anonymous networks) is political, not just technical. I too, as a geek, love the prospect of being able to solve political problems with technical solutions, but it only works up to a certain point.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_th...
Estonian citizenship is not required. May crypto-geeks have an estonian ID certificate. If I were still into crypto I would have made one for myself I think.
Once registered, you don't need to trust the Estonian government at all: you get an IC card and a reader (all open source IIRC) and you can autonomously authenticate. If memory serves, you can even authenticate pseudonymously.
Note that you don't have to trust everyone, you have to trust the e-ID registration system as a whole. That is, a single flawed individual won't be enough to corrupt the whole thing.
Which is fine, but than don't talk about cryptocurrencies. These are supposed to be trustless, not trustless-except-we-all-have-to-trust-the-government. Just talk about some new state system that uses some cryptography somewhere.
> Exchanges respond to these `weak` coins by increasing their confirmation requirements. Some of the really small coins would probably need huge numbers of confirmations. > Lots of confirmations, which would likely damage the value of the coin. > Lower price would reduce the miner hashrate > Lower hashrate would further lower cost of 51% attack. > Exchanges increase confirmations further
-REPEAT-
It would've made more sense to me to show the required capacity / available NiceHash capacity.
It's definitely a lot less do-able for the larger currencies - I still think PoW is a good option for them honestly. This was more to show that 51% attack risk is problematic for smaller coins, and I'd love to hear a discussion on the best way to fix this.