I think that arguing over dictionary definitions is something of an anti-pattern in philosophical (-like) discussions. If we have a common agreement that there is something that we call consciousness, but it is a thing that we do not really understand, then pedantic arguments about exactly what the word does and does not denote are putting the cart before the horse when it comes to understanding the thing itself. It substitutes a lexicographical dispute for an examination of the thing itself, and it is not uncommon for such arguments to be used to talk around the issue by attempting to take certain positions off the table.
As for scientific theories not being strictly true, that hardly distinguishes science from philosophy in general (logic excepted), where there are at least two opinions on every issue of note.
It is an extremely reasonable position that large swathes of what we believe today is also going to be wrong in this sense. For example, the great debate about whether reality is discrete or continuous (currently I think the evidence is discrete, but philosophically maybe we are a simulation run in a continuous universe).
We should try and work to the current state of knowledge of the researchers, but we all know that there is a high risk of something big and impressive being discovered that changes the name of the game, like when they split the atom. We just don't know what happens next.
Our understanding of consciousness also depends on who controls the dictionary and defines consciousness and surrounding terms.