One example of this sort of behavior is in mining. We tend to think of miners as being selfish to a fault, and to some degree, that's true. But sometimes miners have the opportunity to mine empty blocks (a form of attack), and refrain from doing so, because it would harm the ecosystem as a whole and jeopardize their long-term profitability.
Or, to turn this around, if X is the amount of money needed to sustain a 51% attack for 1 block, then you have to wait for 1 confirmation for every X amount of coins received.
Luckily, there are deeper incentives protecting large asic mined chains such as bitcoin.
That's actually, if anything, underestimating the likelihood of a 51% attack. It seems that the more likely path to that situation is collusion between segments of the existing mining community. For such a cartel, the "cost" is zero, it's just a matter of trust.
Shooting from the hip:
They've go this 51% vulnerability that is well known and hypothetically cannot be truly closed. Instead, we rely on the idea that mounting such an attack would be "too expensive". But at the same time, the cost/benefit of mounting such an attack is fairly easy to estimate using public data - all you really need to know is the cost to get to 51% and stay there for a given amount of time, which you can infer by monitoring mining activity, and the current price of the currency you'd want to attack. And you have to assume that whenever the cost of mounting such an attack dips below the benefit, such a thing _will_ happen.
So then, I think that implies that the only other feature you'd need to throw into the mix to ensure a cryptocurrency is ultimately doomed is to make the rate at which new coin can be mined asymptotically approach zero. Such a feature would mean that, in the long term, miners' revenue would ultimately be dominated by transaction fees, which, this being a supremely commodity service, market forces will presumably tend to keep relatively low. That would, in turn, limit the number of miners the economy can support, which would serve to limit the cost of mounting a 51% attack.
Meanwhile, what with a money supply that can't grow being inherently deflationary, the benefit of mounting such an attack would be constantly growing, for as long as said cryptocurrency remains in use.