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A comment on Why a Dutch court stopped high school students from swapping schools (2017). Parent comment

Re:Why a Dutch court stopped high school students from swapp... by karmakaze on Saturday May 19, 2018 @11:51AM (#17108367)
My solution is to encode the swapping in the placement algorithm so that any pair of students can be swapped if they both get a more preferred school. This way you eliminate the gaming aspect since you can't later decide that you want to trade for a school lower on your list. Simple. Fair.
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Re:Why a Dutch court stopped high school students from swapp... by dshields1 on Saturday May 19, 2018 @12:37PM (#17108579)
> any pair of students can be swapped if they both get a more preferred school.

This is the meaning of stable in the stable marriage problem. And the Gale-Shapley algorithm does this.

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Re:Why a Dutch court stopped high school students from swapp... by karmakaze on Saturday May 19, 2018 @04:13PM (#17109535)
The important part is that the algorithm is applied by the system without human interaction after the initial input of preferences. Placements are still final.
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Re:Why a Dutch court stopped high school students from swapp... by rzwitserloot on Saturday May 19, 2018 @05:02PM (#17109723)
I'm not so sure. I haven't done the math but I think you can strategize here: pick your #1 preference as #1 on your list... But then put the most popular school as your #2 (instead of your personal actual second preference). Odds that you end up getting picked by the algorithm for a mutually beneficial trade is high.
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