Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by bscphil on Monday May 14, 2018 @06:47PM
(#17070111)
Surely, telling users to uninstall it was a temporary measure until they can be certain that the bug is fixed. Without it removed, there was a risk that users could be quickly targeted with previously captured replayed messages and if their clients automatically decrypt then it would in fact be a disclosure vulnerability with no user interaction needed.
Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by deong on Monday May 14, 2018 @10:41AM
(#17065923)
I believe the recommendation is to use something like Signal or iMessage -- an end-to-end encrypted channel that isn't email.
Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by gsnedders on Monday May 14, 2018 @02:16PM
(#17067963)
And which have perfect forward secrecy, which PGP will never have without adding some new per-message communication between the two parties (which would totally violate the layering on top of email).
That being said, why would EFF tell people to completely uninstall it? When I hear that, I think "There is a crazy, in the wild, no user interaction needed remote code execution vulnerability". If someone had a use for PGP/GPG email (assuming they understand the threat model and the metadata that is not encrypted), surely they're better off with a buggy version that with pure cleartext?