Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by onlydnaq on Monday May 14, 2018 @07:05AM
(#17064400)
If I want to decrypt a message to you that I have intercepted I can create my own email containing a modification of the intercepted message and send it to you, causing you to send me the plaintext contents.
Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by usrusr on Monday May 14, 2018 @09:02AM
(#17065085)
That's my understanding as well. Someone could try to make your email client img-src-get the plaintext of previously intercepted mails to a remote server, but it would be a very "noisy" attack: your typical PGP user would very quickly fall into a panic if they received all their old encrypted mail again, and for some reason the client would constantly beg for external image downloads in apparently plain text mails.
Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by geocar on Monday May 14, 2018 @06:45AM
(#17064327)
Sure. Assume you're a state-actor who wants to read someone's email. You can force their ISP to add code to their SMTP server that adds an efail-pixel jacket, but you can't force them to turn over the customer keys.
Re:EFail – Vulnerabilities in end-to-end encryption technolo...
by cromwellian on Monday May 14, 2018 @10:55AM
(#17066055)
Ah ok, I see, it’s kind of a replay attack. Seems like SMIME itself is broken because it doesn’t do whole message integrity.
Am I missin something?