P.S. just ordered a yubikey security key, excited to add this additional layer to my own personal byzantine security labyrinth. Or maybe simplify it, who knows!
At least Web Authentication platform credentials should let you have multiple authenticators without having to buy an extra YubiKey.
No, since passwordless login is available, the lowest denominator applies: single factor. Despite all your efforts it will most likely be possible to perform a passwordless login even when password is required in a few years (as these things get broken). The something you know is useless, as it can be ignored. And because it can, it will. Either by force, by negligence or by laziness.
It's also allowed for authenticators to always require PIN even if the server doesn't, but the current YubiKey obeys the server's preference.
But yes, there will of course be bugs. But that is also true for password logins, so I don't see it as a particularly convincing argument.
So the ‘passwordless’ option here is either rename the password to PIN or eliminate it to provide single-factor login. The latter is a dream for smart attackers, since there is always some social engineering route they can use to acquire a legit token.
Also: unlike a shared secret like a password you share _everywhere_ (and let's face it, most people do), an on-device PIN can be changed in a single place should it ever be compromised.
Undoubtedly the same holds true for these Microsoft services.
It was all in vein; the browser support is still horrible, no one want to use it and it's not possible to use on mobile. How can you make a security solution that doesn't work on mobile?
Making a new "Web Auth" standard is a huge mistake, and I will not fall into that trap again.
If anything, the web needs technology that allows browsers to present secure third-party auth to web services (e.g. through TouchID, the way that Apple Pay works on Safari and Mobile Safari).
https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2
> A: It could mean single- or two-factor. FIDO2 and the new YubiKeys support an on-device PIN that isn't shared with the server, like conventional smart cards. This allows the key to act as both "something you have" (the key itself) and "something you know"
If "something you know" is physically stored on "something you have", doesn't this make "something you know" completely moot?. Please explain how this doesn't simply reduce to "something you have". In other words, if someone steals your Yubikey, can they login as you without knowing anything additional?
Doesn't this PIN become a master password for all the websites at that point?
There might be a way to steal the PIN if the user enters it on a compromised machine, but you can't do anything with the PIN. You need the physical device as well.
It seems like the scenario you're describing in further replies is this: 1) Alice has an account at service A and an account at service B, and authenticates to both with the same FIDO2 token. 2) Eve calls service A and convinces them she's Alice and needs a new token. 3) Service A sends Eve a new token registered to Alice's account. 4) Eve uses the new token to log in as Alice at service B.
The above attack is not possible, since the keypair for service A is not usable at service B. This separation of credentials for separate services is a fundamental FIDO/WebAuthn design feature for damage control and user privacy. Eve can use the new token to log in to service A, yes, but only to service A.
Even if service A and service B were to try to cooperate out-of-band to support each other's credentials, the browser would not let them unless they're on the same domain.
Needless to say, this is much, much harder than stealing someone's password.
About 15% of the user population really cares about security and will take the right precautions. It’s the other 85% that are soft targets that keep attackers in business.
What you do is you take this key that unlocks the kingdom.
And then you keep it safe.
Unlike before there isn't 20 keys that unlock parts of the kingdom that might lead to unlocking other kingdoms via roundabout ways. Your attention for security can be focused on a single key.
The average users will be much safer if we force them to only have to remember one single password that can be securely used for everything without the usual drawbacks (that's why security people recommend password managers)
With personal password managers, no third party is issuing tokens for access - just you. So it’s unlikley to be chosen for an attack - because it’s too hard for the attacker to acquire the credentials for access without detection.
No third party issues tokens in WebAuthn either - you have your one or a couple of authenticators you use everywhere, and those authenticators create their credential keypairs locally on the device (and a separate keypair is created for each site - they're not shared between sites).
Password managers don't protect against this. People have given attackers their entire password vault, all you need is a convincing story about some security audit and you needing to review all their passwords. Users believe this.
The solution there is to take away the things a user can leak (passwords) and replace them with things that can only be stolen (tokens). We can train users to never give away their yubikey. Of course some will still fall for social engineering but for a yubikey/equivalent it's fully acceptable to say "never ever never give to anyone, no matter what they say".
With a hardware key you gain the advantage of the attackers having to physically gain access to that key.
- Q: Doesn't passwordless mean single factor? Isn't that insecure?
A: It could mean single- or two-factor. FIDO2 and the new YubiKeys support an on-device PIN that isn't shared with the server, like conventional smart cards. This allows the key to act as both "something you have" (the key itself) and "something you know" (the PIN for the key). The PIN is optional, though, so both the single factor and two factor use cases are possible.
- Q: Is this Azure/Windows/AD only?
A: This post highlights the partnership with Microsoft and the integration with their products, but FIDO2 is not Microsoft-only (and Yubico will not be the only key vendor). CTAP2, once finished, will be published as an open standard like U2F, and the accompanying Web Authentication API [1] (WIP) is an OS-agnostic W3C standard enabling the same features in browsers.
[1]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/
- Q: Will I need a new YubiKey?
A: For passwordless (PIN) login, yes. However, existing YubiKeys with U2F support will be usable as a 2nd factor in Web Authentication, and sites that currently use U2F can upgrade to using the Web Authentication API without needing their users to re-enroll their keys.
Full disclosure: I'm a Yubico engineer and one of the editors of the Web Authentication spec.