The random-salt has to be stored, at least for the length of the authentication request, because the server needs to generate the same hashed-hashed-password as the client to be able to match and authenticate.

> Alternatively a timestamp would be just as good.

I don't see how that would work at all.

I also don't see the need to go any further in detail about how this scheme will not be better than the current best practices.

Never. Roll. Your. Own. Crypto. https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/18197/why-shoul...

A timestamp would work the same way it works in (e.g.) Google Authenticator.

Incidentally, I really resent how it's impossible to have a discussion of anything at all related to cryptography on HN without somebody bringing up the "never roll your own crypto" dogma.

If the ideas being proposed are bad, please point out why, don't just imply that everyone except you is too stupid to understand.

Edit:

I just reread your comment above and you did a perfectly good job of explaining why it's a bad idea, I must have misunderstood first time round: it's a bad idea because now the login credentials get compromised in a database leak instead of a MITM, which is both more common in practice and affects more users at once.

Sorry for saying you didn't explain why it is a bad idea.

You have to store the salt somehow, because you need to check that the salted, hashed password matches.