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Re:Linux RNG flaws by oconnor663 on Wednesday May 02, 2018 @10:37AM (#16977264)
If you continue to the next sentence in that man page:

> If this is of concern in your application, use getrandom(2) or /dev/random instead.

These bugs affect getrandom too.

Re:Linux RNG flaws by lihes on Thursday May 03, 2018 @10:09AM (#16986173)
Where is it written? Could you pin point it? I see urandom everywhere.
Re:Linux RNG flaws by oconnor663 on Thursday May 03, 2018 @02:20PM (#16988373)
I got it from this part, unless I'm misreading:

> Multiple callers, including sys_getrandom(..., flags=0), attempt to wait for the

> RNG to become cryptographically safe before reading from it by checking for

> crng_ready() and waiting if necessary. However, crng_ready() only checks for

> `crng_init > 0`, and `crng_init==1` does not imply that the RNG is

> cryptographically safe.