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Re:The False Allure of Hashing for Anonymization by bglusman on Monday April 30, 2018 @11:00PM (#16964292)
For the specific use case in question, what I've been doing for years is not just hashing the data, but hashing an internal secret AND the data. The secret isn't stored in the database anywhere (usually an env var but could be a secret in vault or other outside config), so our hashes are deterministic (and don't need a seperate salt for each one), but our hashes will never cooincide with another system's hashes. I didn't see this mentioned in article but didn't read thoroughly, I thought this was a pretty good compromise but curious for other perspectives/forget if I read this technique somewhere or just made it up as a reasonably good safeguard.
Re:The False Allure of Hashing for Anonymization by GordonS on Tuesday May 01, 2018 @07:54AM (#16966251)
> hashing an internal secret AND the data

This is essentially how HMAC works (HMAC is mentioned in the article). It's generally considered safer to use a 'real' HMAC algorithm instead of rolling your own.

Re:The False Allure of Hashing for Anonymization by aflagatopamoon on Tuesday May 01, 2018 @04:57PM (#16971529)
This is called a pepper:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pepper_(cryptography)

If you read the article above, you'll see that you still need a salt, since users with very simple passwords will have the same hash: crack one, and you can crack the others for free.

Re:The False Allure of Hashing for Anonymization by bglusman on Friday May 11, 2018 @01:05PM (#17048979)
Yeah I should have been clear this wasn't for passwords at all, ever, this was/is only for other kinds of PII